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Prospective overruling – it’s about time
Jesse Wall*
“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there”.1
The past has different standards, different values and different 
expectations flowing from different rules.  It is as if it were a foreign 
jurisdiction.  Time is therefore an important factor concerning how 
we should view the legal consequences of conduct.  The courts, as 
adjudicators, determine the legal consequences of events well after they 
occur.  When applying the common law, they are sometimes forced to 
cross temporal borders into the past but apply contemporary rules. 
This creates a problem for the rule of law in the form of ‘retrospective 
common law’.
In this article I will explain how the common law operates to produce 
retrospective law and how this is in turn premised upon certain 
jurisprudential assumptions.  I will then turn to assess the prospect 
that ‘prospective overruling’ may provide a solution to the problem 
of retrospective common law.  The purpose of this article is to provide 
an argument in support of appellate courts prospectively overruling 
prior precedents.  Accordingly, I shall set out the merits of, and refute 
any objections to, prospective overruling.  However, it is necessary to 
first explore theoretical foundations of the problem that prospective 
overruling is purporting to solve.  It is necessary to explore these 
theoretical foundations so as to avoid the disagreement about prospective 
overruling dissolving into a disagreement about the law itself.  
I.  Retrospective Common Law
When a court decides to depart from a prior precedent, and restate the 
law, a court is attaching new legal consequences to events that occurred 
prior to that restatement of the law.  This outcome is the result of an 
inevitable tension between two conflicting aims of the common law. 
On one hand, in accordance with the rule of law tradition, it is expected 
to be consistent, predictable and certain.  On the other hand, it should 
also be malleable so as to arrive at fair and just outcomes.  This tension 
between certainty and fairness operates beneath the surface of all judicial 
reasoning but it surfaces most abruptly when a court is considering 
overturning a prior precedent.  
To ensure consistency and certainty one of the basic principles in 
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the administration of justice is to treat like cases alike.2  Hence a prior 
precedent represents a statement of law that can be relied upon if a 
sufficiently analogous case were to arise.  However, in order to achieve 
a just and fair result the court may find it necessary to depart from 
the precedent and replace it with a new statement of law.  The aims of 
certainty and fairness may therefore conflict in a particular case. 
However, this conflict does not cause retrospective law.  The further 
catalyst is the courts’ adjudicative function.3  That is, retrospectivity arises 
because the courts’ function is to decide the legal consequences of past 
acts or omissions.  This means that when a court departs from a prior 
precedent, the new statement of law determines the legal consequences 
of past acts or omissions.  Yet the old statement of law (embodied in the 
prior precedent) arguably was the law when the act or omission was 
performed.  By overturning a prior precedent, courts announce and apply 
law that attaches new legal consequences to past events, so there is an 
element of retrospectivity whenever they overturn a prior precedent. 
The problem is that any form of retrospective change is an afront to the 
rule of law.  Whereas prospective legal change allows for rearrangement 
of individual affairs to align with the new state of the law, retrospective 
change undercuts our ability to plan our affairs in reliance on the law 
promulgated at the time.  A major ‘harm’ of retrospective law is therefore 
the injury it inflicts on the rule of law.  The law cannot be predictable, 
and people are unable to be guided by it, if it can be changed after the 
fact.  Alternatively, in the words of Bentham:4
It is the judges (as we have seen) that make the common law.  Do you 
know how they make it?  Just as a man makes law for his dog.  When 
your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, 
and then [discipline] him for it.  This is the way you make laws for your 
dog: and this is the way judges make laws for you and me.
The problem of retrospective common law has recently come to the 
forefront in the decisions of the House of Lords in National Westminister 
Bank Plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd5 and the New Zealand Supreme Court 
in Chamberlains v Lai.6  Both these cases illustrate the problem of 
retrospective common law change.  National Westminister concerned a 
debenture which Spectrum Plus had created over its debts in favour 
of National Westminster.  In particular, it concerned whether National 
Westminster had a fixed or floating charge.  If it was a floating charge, 
Spectrum Plus’ creditors would have priority over the bank; if not, the 
bank would be entitled to the whole of the proceeds.  This question of 
2 R Cross & J W Harris, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, 1991) 
228. 
3 National Westminster Bank Plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41, Lord 
Nicholls, at paragraph 4.
4 J Bentham, Truth versus Ashurst, or, Law as it is, contrasted with what is said 
to be (1823).
5 National Westminster Bank Plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41.
6 Chamberlains v Lai [2007] 2 NZLR 7.
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law was governed by the rule established in Siebe Gorman v Barclays Bank7 
that such a debenture operates as a fixed charge over the debt.8
The law prior to Spectrum Plus was therefore that such debentures 
created a fixed charge in accordance with the law set out in Siebe Gorman. 
However, the House of Lords unanimously held Siebe Gorman was wrong 
in law and should be overruled.9  Their Lordships held, contrary to Siebe 
Gorman, that the key distinction between a fixed and floating charge was 
whether or not the asset was finally appropriated as security for the debt 
until a future event.10  As a consequence, the debenture was held to be 
a floating charge. 
The new statement of law concerning the characteristics of a floating 
charge in Spectrum Plus attached new consequences in terms of the 
priority of creditors.  The debenture had been arranged prior to the 
annunciation of the new statement of law and in reliance on the old 
statement in Siebe Gorman.  The new statement in Spectrum Plus thus 
operated retrospectively to change the status of the debenture and to 
upset reliance on law that was expressed at the time of its formation. 
However, as Lord Devlin extra-judicially commented at an earlier 
time, ‘A judge-made change in the law rarely comes out of a blue sky. 
Rumblings from Olympus in the form of obiter dicta will give warning 
of unsettled weather’.11  
Even before Spectrum Plus there were such ‘rumblings from Olympus’. 
The English Court of Appeal in Re New Bullas Trading12 supported the Siebe 
Gorman decision, but the Privy Council in Agnew v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue13 held that the decision in Bullas Trading was wrongly decided. 
This cast doubt on the validity of the reasoning in Siebe Gorman.  
Such ‘unsettled weather’ does not avoid the retrospective effect of 
the judicial change in law enacted by the overruling of Siebe Gorman. 
Despite the Privy Council questioning the validity of Siebe Gorman, the 
House of Lords nonetheless felt compelled to overturn explicitly the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Siebe Gorman.  This suggests Siebe Gorman 
was the law in England until it was retrospectively changed, and that 
it was reasonable to previously rely on Siebe Gorman as the law within 
that jurisdiction.
The decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Chamberlains v Lai 
is a similar instance of retrospective change.  When the events occurred 
that gave rise to the proceeding in Chamberlains ‘everyone would have 
7 Siebe Gorman v Barclays Bank [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142.
8 Lord Scott of Foscote, at paragraph 105, held that there was no material 
difference between the debenture in Siebe Gorman and in Spectrum Plus.
9 Spectrum Plus, Lord Nicholls at paragraph 2. 
10 Spectrum Plus, Lord Scott at paragraph 111.
11 Lord Devlin, ‘Judges and Lawmakers’ (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 1, 
10. 
12 Re New Bullas Trading [1994] 1 BCLC 485.
13 Agnew v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 28.
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said that under New Zealand law as it stood then barristers were immune 
from suits for negligence in relation to protected conduct’.14  Yet, eleven 
years after the event the Court found that barristers’ immunity ought 
to be abolished, and, as a consequence, the immunity was removed 
retrospectively.  The Supreme Court held that the House of Lord’s 
decision in Arthur J S Hall v Simons15 had rendered the position of 
barristers’ immunity in New Zealand law uncertain.  So, as in Spectrum 
Plus, the Court used the ‘gathering of clouds’ to obscure the retrospective 
effect of this common law change. 
1.  Rules and Retrospectivity
However, this problem of retrospective common law is only perceived 
from certain jurisprudential standpoints.  The way one views 
retrospectivity in the common law depends on how one conceives the 
law itself.  First of all, it is only a problem if the law is viewed through 
the conceptual framework of Legal Positivism.  In contrast, from a 
Dworkinian perspective, the common law does not change retrospectively 
if the courts are approaching their task in the proper way. 
HLA Hart provides perhaps the best Positivist account of law. 
According to Hart, the law is essentially a union of primary rules of 
obligation and secondary rules of adjudication, recognition and change. 
The primary rules relate to the substance of the law, the secondary rules 
to the procedure for determining the law.  The way the law can change, 
according to Hart, is specified through secondary rules.  “The simplest 
form of such a rule is that which empowers an individual or body of 
persons to introduce new primary rules…and to eliminate old rules”.16 
For example, the rule that legislation may introduce new primary rules 
that defeat earlier primary rules arising out of custom or precedent is 
an example of a secondary rule of both recognition and change.  The 
rule that the New Zealand Supreme Court can restate the common law 
in a way that bound the New Zealand Court of Appeal is a further rule 
of the same kind. 
There are still many sources of ambiguity in rule following.  First, 
when we come to identify which rule applies, not all cases fall squarely 
under existing primary rules.  Some cases may fall within the gaps in 
the rules. It may be said this leaves areas of legal uncertainty caused by 
our inability to foresee all “possible combinations of circumstances”.17 
In such cases, the outcome cannot be determined by a pre-existing rule. 
Instead, the judge may be forced to choose between competing interests 
to enact “subordinate legislation”18 or “interstitial legislation”19 through 
14 Chamberlains, Tipping J at paragraph 132.
15 Arthur J S Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615. 
16 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961) 92-93.
17 Ibid, 128.
18 Ibid, 134.
19 J Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Oxford University Press, 1982) 
17. 
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judicial decision making.  Second, in terms of interpretation, some cases 
will fall into the penumbra of legal uncertainty concerning the meaning 
of a particular rule, so the court must choose between competing 
interpretations of the rule. 
A set of events, to be governed by a prior precedent, must be seen as 
squarely covered by the nucleus of current legal rules.  Then the precedent 
can clearly determine the outcome of the case.  The jurisdiction of a 
later court to depart from that prior precedent must then derive from 
a secondary rule that enables legal change.  For example, in its Practice 
Statement (Judicial Precedent),20 the House of Lords declared that it was 
able to depart from its earlier decisions, recognising its ability to introduce 
new primary rules and eliminate old ones. 
According to this conception of law, prior precedent (a) establishes 
the primary rule (x) which can be identified through various secondary 
rules as the law.  However, when a court relies on a secondary rule of 
change to create new precedent (b), the court overturns prior precedent 
(a) to eliminate rule (x) and introduce new primary rule (y). 
The law that could be determined through the secondary rules of 
recognition prior to decision (b) was primary rule (x).  However, decision 
(b), in overturning that prior precedent, attaches new legal consequences 
to past conduct by applying primary rule (y) to acts and omissions that 
were performed whilst the secondary rules of recognition would have 
picked out primary rule (x) as the law in force.  Therefore, if we perceive 
the legal system as operating as Hart’s conception of law suggests, 
retrospective change occurs.
However, a competing conception of the law is offered by Ronald 
Dworkin.  One of the main reasons for Dworkin’s rejection of Hart’s 
conception of law was that it authorised just this kind of judicial, 
retrospective law-making in “hard cases”.21  Under Dworkin’s conception 
of law the common law can operate without retrospectivity both in 
hard cases at the margins of the law and when clear prior precedents 
are overruled. 
Dworkin offers a wider ontology of the law. According to Dworkin, 
the law applicable to a case goes beyond the clearly recognisable rules 
found in the governing precedents in the immediate field.  Dworkin 
argues that the law includes principles and other standards and that 
Positivism “forces us to miss the important roles of these standards that 
20 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1962] 1 WLR 1234.
21 R Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’, in Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1987) 
81.
Precedent (a) Precedent (b)
Primary Rule (x) Primary Rule (y)
Change in Law
Secondary Rule of Change
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are not rules”.22 
There are three key characteristics of Dworkinian principles.  The first 
is that principles may be derived from sources beyond the immediate 
applicable precedents, such as a collateral area of law.  Second, these 
principles have legal pedigree and can be relied upon to set aside a rule 
when the rule does not ‘fit’ the fabric of the legal system.  Lastly, and 
most importantly, Dworkinian principles are already embedded in the 
law.  When rules and principles conflict, one is held to be more important 
than the other in a particular context, but if a principle is defeated it is not 
necessarily excluded from our legal system.  In that particular case the 
principle is simply outweighed by another rule or principle.  According 
to Dworkin, rules, in contrast, do not have this characteristic: “If two 
rules conflict, one of them cannot be a valid rule”.23
Dworkin would therefore contend that a rule may be set aside in favour 
of an existing principle (as was the case in Dworkin’s example of Riggs 
v Palmer24).  But this change does not operate with retrospective effect, 
as that principle already existed in the fabric of the law. 
Dworkin contends that Hart’s rules of recognition cannot identify 
all the relevant principles.  Nor can they determine the appropiate 
balance and priority to be struck between principles, since this requires 
a normative assessment of the competing principles derived from moral 
or political theories they represent.  Hence, Dworkinian principles fall 
outside the rule-based concept of law that Legal Positivists defend. 
In terms of retrospective common law, the key difference between Hart 
and Dworkin emerges when a principle provides the impetus to overturn 
a rule: in essence, when rules and principles conflict.  Hart would contend 
that, since rules have the right pedigree, the law is represented by the 
rule, and to overturn the rule is to (unexpectedly) change the law.  For 
Dworkin, the law includes the principle.  Overturning the rule is not 
therefore a change in law, since the existing principle (with legal pedigree) 
has merely been prioritised over the rule. 
As Dworkin’s ontology of law suggests, to view overturning  precedent 
as merely rule (x) in precedent (a) being changed for rule (y) in case (b) 
may be too simplistic.  There is, according to Dworkin, more than just 
rule (x) in the legal fabric.  There may be other principles that conflict 
with the existing rule.  This conflict may cause the ‘rumblings from 
Olympus’.  If we view changes in common law through this lens we can 
see more clearly the role that Lord Devlin’s ‘unsettled weather’ plays in 
predicting judge-made changes in the law.
Moreover, these other principles may point toward a new rule 
that would better fit and integrate within the legal fabric.  When a 
22 R Dworkin, ‘Is law a system of rules?’ in The Philosophy of Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1977) 39.
23 Ibid, 48.
24 Riggs v Palmer 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 (1889); see R Dworkin, The Philosophy 
of Law 44. 
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court overturns a prior precedent, it is removing a legal rule that was 
inconsistent with higher principles already present in the law.  The 
law as a whole therefore does not change when the prior precedent 
is overruled. The law is simply re-declared as if the new decision had 
always been the law but previous courts had failed to adequately apply 
the right principles in that situation.  The newly stated legal rule is not 
‘new’ because it was based upon ‘law’, including principles, that existed 
prior to the decision and pointed toward the current result.  Thus, the 
common law would change with retrospective effect only if we adopted 
the positivist account of the law as the union of primary and secondary 
rules, and not Dworkin’s account which supplements the rules with 
principles. 
2.  Realism and Retrospectivity
The claim that when a court overturns a prior precedent the court 
enacts retrospective law not only rests on Positivist assumptions about 
rules, it also assumes a certain conception of judicial decision making. 
It assumes that judges perform a quasi-legislative function, that judges 
make the law and they may do so (in appropriate cases) by reference to 
policy factors and values.25  This assumption underlies my explanation 
of retrospective common law: that “in order to achieve a fair and just 
result the court may find it necessary to depart from the statement of 
law in the precedent case”.
However, such a ‘Realist’ conception of the function of judicial decision 
making is contestable.  Moreover, alternative accounts of the function 
of judicial decisions may yield different accounts of retrospectivity in 
the common law.  In particular, according to the declaratory theory of 
judgment, the common law does not change with retrospective effect. 
The declaratory theory of judgment also seeks to describe the 
phenomenon of judicial decision making.  According to this theory, the 
entire common law already exists awaiting judicial declaration.  As a 
consequence, “if the judges change their mind about a particular common 
law rule or principle, they are not changing the law”.26  Rather, judges 
are declaring the true state of the common law. 
Any theory of judgment is ultimately premised upon a particular 
judicial method, or a particular analytical approach to legal problems. 
The declaratory theory reflects a method that might be called legalism. 
This method considers that the “law consists largely of posited precepts 
laid down in legislation or leading judicial reasoning”27 and that legal 
questions can be answered through “logical reasoning based on the text 
of the relevant law, to the exclusion of social, political and economic 
25 A Mason, ‘Legislative and judicial law-making: can we locate an 
identifiable boundary?’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 15, 21.
26 Ibid, 18. 
27 J Smillie, ‘Formalism, fairness and efficiency: civil adjudication in New 
Zealand’ [1996] New Zealand Law Review 254, 255.
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considerations”.28  On this view, by adopting a legalist approach 
to judicial decisions, a Judge is able to work within a body of legal 
materials to find the correct rule and doctrine which are already part of 
the common law. 
Since, according to this declaratory theory of judgment the court does 
not change the law, the common law does not operate with retrospective 
effect.  This is because, when a court departs from a prior precedent, it is 
not doing so in an effort to arrive at a fair and just result.  Rather, the court 
is removing erroneous decisions from the law.  The erroneous decision 
(the prior precedent) was never the law per se, which means reliance on 
the precedent was not reliance on the law.  Instead, the law has always 
been the rule that is later declared by the court.  As Tipping J noted:29 
The traditional (declaratory) theory involved the proposition that in 
deciding what the law was the courts were deciding what it had always 
been…hence the courts could not, or at least should not, state that at the 
time of the relevant events the law was X but from the date of judgment 
onwards it was to be Y.
However, to some members of the judiciary, the declaratory theory of 
judgment is a fiction.  As Lord Reid stated:30
There was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that 
judges make law – they only declare it.  Those with a taste for fairy tales 
seem to have thought that in some Aladdin’s cave is hidden the common 
law in all its splendour, and that on a judge’s appointment there descends 
on him knowledge of the magic words ‘open sesame’.  Bad decisions are 
given when judges muddle their passwords and the wrong doors open.  
But we do not believe in fairy tales any more. 
Furthermore, with particular regard to retrospectivity, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson has stated:31
The theoretical position has been that judges do not make the law; they 
discover and declare the law which is throughout the same.  According to 
this theory, when an earlier decision is overruled the law is not changed; 
its true nature is disclosed, having existed in that form all along.  This 
theoretical position is… a fairy tale in which no one believes… . But while 
the underlying myth has been rejected, its progeny – the retrospective 
effect of change made by judicial decision – remains. 
The declaratory theory of judgment seems unpopular. Rather than 
exclusively confining their method to existing legal materials, most 
members of the judiciary seem to have “accepted direct responsibility 
for adapting and developing the law to meet current needs”.32 
An alternative theory of judicial decision making is often called 
28 Mason, 18. 
29 Chamberlains, Tipping J at paragraph 130. 
30 Lord Reid, ‘The judge as lawmaker’ (1972)       The Journal of Public Teachers 
of Law 22.
31 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council (No. 8) [1999] 2 AC 349. 
32 Smillie, 258.  
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legal realism.  This theory holds that judges make the law and do so by 
reference to policy factors and values.  The court’s function is still only 
quasi-legislative; it is still constrained to an extent by the existing law. 
Nonetheless, it is still accepted that the courts engage in some moral or 
political judgment when determining the law. 
Just as the declaratory theory of judgment needs to be premised 
upon a judicial method, the legal realist approach also needs a method 
of addressing legal questions.  After all, if judges are to depart from 
strictly legal materials and shape the common law towards ‘just and fair’ 
outcomes, there needs to be a ‘philosophical touchstone’ or ‘analytical 
framework’ to guide the law toward that end.33  As Sir Ivor Richardson 
has noted, for judges to make value judgments they need “a frame 
of reference against which to probe and test the economic, social and 
political questions involved”.34  This is because ‘just’ and ‘fair’ are rather 
vacuous terms without an analytical framework for substantiating their 
meaning.  
For example, the ‘philosophical touchstone’ that informed Lord Atkin’s 
decision in Donoghue v Stevenson35 was arguably Christianity’s neighbour 
principle.  For Lord Cooke, the ‘philosophical touchstone’ was a form 
of fairness based on societal expectations: “that once the facts of any 
given case have been fully elicited most people would agree on the 
fair result”.36  In contrast, Sir Ivor Richardson has been sceptical of the 
‘fairness’ framework. Instead, Sir Ivor purported to adopt an objective 
approach to legal change, first, in the form of functional utilitarianism, 
then, later, in the form of economic analysis.37
Regardless of the particular touchstone that judges adopt to give 
content to their notion of ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’, if judges are to depart from 
legal materials and engage in political and moral judgment, they need a 
method or framework to use.  Under this general conception of judgment 
– Legal Realism – a judge performs a slight legislative function by shaping 
the law in accordance with a particular philosophical touchstone.  When 
a court is overturning a prior precedent, the court is changing the law 
in order to achieve ‘justice’.  The adjudicative function of the judiciary 
means that the new statement of law is then applied as if it had always 
been the law.  Therefore, if we view the function of judicial decision 
making through a legal realist lens, we can perceive the retrospective 
effects of a court overturning a prior precedent. 
To summarise, so far we have addressed three layers of theoretical 
questions: (1) what is the law; (2) what is the proper analytical method 
for solving legal problems; and (3) what is the appropriate judicial 
33 Ibid.
34 Sir Ivor Richardson, ‘The role of the appellate judge’ (1981) 5           Otago Law 
Review 1, 9. 
35 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
36 Sir Robin Cooke, ‘Fairness’ (1989) 19      Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 421, 422.
37 Smillie, 269.  
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function?  At face value, the two assumptions that my claim rests upon 
(grounded in the philospophies of Legal Positivism and Legal Realism) 
seem irreconcilable: if the law is the union of primary and secondary 
rules there may be no need to engage in moral or political judgement. 
However, there are at least three instances in which judges seem to 
resort to moral and political judgement even when operating within the 
framework of Positivism.  The first two instances are when ‘rules run 
out’: either, in terms of their identification or their interpretation.  The 
third instance is when the court opts to use its jurisdiction to depart from 
a prior precedent.38  In doing so the court employs a secondary rule of 
legal change.  However, the decision to depart from a prior precedent 
is not made with sole reference to existing law.  The court, in deciding 
to change the common law, shapes it in accordance with a particular 
philosophical touchstone or concept of fairness. 
Hence, the claim that a court enacts retrospective law when overturning 
a prior precedent seems largely to rest on two jurisprudential claims: 
first, that the law is the union of primary and secondary rules; second, 
that judges resort to moral and political judgement in deciding to depart 
from a prior primary rule and establish a new one.  Elements of both 
Legal Positivism and Legal Realism therefore seem to be involved. 
When we view these theoretical claims alongside the court’s inherent 
adjudicative function, the problem of retrospective common law 
surfaces quite abruptly: the courts occasionally change the law (akin to 
legislation) whilst in the same move determining the legal consequences 
of past conduct (adjudication) so that the law applied is distinct from 
that previously promulgated.  On this view, there is a problem of 
retrospectivity in the common law and any retrospective law abrogates 
the core principle that “the law should be such that people will be able 
to be guided by it”.39
II. The Prospect of Prospectivity
Now that we have identified the problem of retrospectivity in the 
common law, we can assess the judicial device of prospective overruling 
as a possible solution.  First, however, what prospective overruling entails 
needs to be outlined. 
Prospective overruling can take various forms.  The most common 
form is “pure” prospective overruling. In this form the effect of the 
court’s ruling applies exclusively to events that occur after the date of the 
decision.40  All events occurring before that date are governed by the prior 
precedent, including the events that gave rise to the current proceeding. 
This pure approach is the orthodox form of prospective overruling in 
38 R v Chilton [2006] 2 NZLR 341; Practice Statement (Judicial Practice) [1962] 
1 WLR 1234.
39 J Raz, ‘The rule of law and its virtue’ (1977) 93          Law Quarterly Review 196, 
198.
40 Spectrum Plus, Lord Nicholls at paragraph 9.
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appellate courts in the United States41 and India.42  As will be discussed, 
it has been criticised for removing the incentive for litigants to challenge 
the prevailing view of the law, as, even if the litigant is successful, the 
change in law will not apply to their claim. 
There are permutations of the pure form. The court may find that the 
circumstances require ‘selective’ prospective overruling so that the ruling 
is generally prospective in its effect although retrospective with regards to 
the parties to the current proceeding.  This was, in essence, the approach 
taken by the Supreme Court of Ireland in Murphy v Attorney General.43 
The Supreme Court held certain tax provisions to be unconstitutional 
and void but restricted the restitutionary right to recover payments made 
by way of taxes to plaintiffs in the proceeding.  It has been contended 
that this form of overruling, as will be later discussed, fails to treat like 
cases alike since it discriminates between the parties to the proceeding 
and others who have similar claims even though the relevant facts giving 
rise to their respective claims may be identical.  
Alternatively, a court may find it appropriate to overrule a precedent 
with ‘delayed’ prospective effect so that the ruling will not take effect 
until a future date.  For instance, the European Court of Justice delayed 
the effect of its ruling in Banca Popolare di Cremona v Agenzia Entrate Ufficio 
Cremona44 to allow the State a reasonable opportunity to introduce new 
legislation.
In contrast to the Supreme Courts of the United States and India, 
and the European Court of Justice, prospective overruling has not 
found favour in Australia or Canada.  In Re: Edward and Edward45 the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held prospective overruling to be “a 
dramatic deviation from the norm in both Canada and England”.  The 
High Court of Australia in Ha v New South Wales46 went as far as declaring 
that it had no power to overrule cases with only prospective effect. 
The position in New Zealand and the United Kingdom is uncertain. 
The House of Lords in Spectrum Plus kept the door open to the concept 
of prospective overruling.  However, the House of Lords refused to 
recognise any legitimate forms or instances of it.  Tipping and Thomas JJ 
in Chamberlains entertained, in the abstract, the possibility of prospective 
overruling and Tipping J strongly favoured the selective form. 
41 See Chevron Oil Co v Hudson (1971) 404 US 97; Linkletter v Walker (1965) 
381 US 618; Bingham v Miller (1848) 17 Ohio 445.
42 See Golak Nath v State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762; IndiaCement Ltd v State 
of Tamil Nadu (1990) 1 SCC 12.
43 Murphy v Attorney General [1982] IR 241.
44 Banca Popolare di Cremona v Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona (Case C-
475/03), 17 March 2005.
45 In Re: Edward and Edward (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 654, 660.
46 Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465.
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III. Objections to Prospective Overruling 
So far I have suggested that, to avoid the harm of retrospective common 
law-making, the court might overrule the precedent with prospective 
effect only.  However, it has been  contended that prospective overruling 
would create more problems than it solves.  
In particular, there are three salient objections worthy of consideration. 
Prospective overruling can be objected to on (1) constitutional grounds, 
contending that prospective overruling is outside the legitimate function 
of a judiciary.  A further concern is that pure prospective overruling may 
(2) remove the incentive to challenge the prevailing view of the law. 
Alternatively, it has been argued that (3) selective prospective overruling 
discriminates as it fails to treat like cases alike. 
1.  The Constitutional Objection  
Lord Devlin considered prospective overruling to be “the Rubicon 
that divides the judicial and the legislative powers”.47  More recently, 
Dr Juratowitch has argued that prospective overruling is inconsistent 
with the “proper scope of the judicial function in common law systems”.48 
This objection represents a cluster of claims that the judiciary, because 
of its institutional features, should not prospectively overrule.  These 
institutional features include: insulation from political pressure and 
accountability, the limited perspective of viewing only the facts before the 
court, and the provision of relief that “looks backward and compensates, 
punishes or invalidates an act which has already been committed”.49 
Because of these institutional characteristics, it is argued that the courts 
should not prospectively overrule as the court would be making new 
law without applying it to the case before the court, and in doing so, 
the court is looking beyond the facts before the court which usurps the 
role of the legislature. 
The essence of the objection is that the courts’ primary function is 
adjudicative so the courts should not perform legislative tasks.  In 
response, I would question whether, those instances in which an appellate 
court overturns a prior precedent,  it is always acting primarily as an 
adjudicator. 
I have described the cause of retrospective common law as the tension 
that arises between the aims of achieving certainty and fairness in the 
law, compounded by the courts’ adjudicative function.  However, there 
is a further hidden cause of retrospective common law that lies behind 
these competing aims, namely, the court’s legislative function. 
The twin demands of producing certainty and fairness are placed on 
the common law because the courts not only decide the legal status of 
47 Lord Devlin, The Judge (Oxford University Press, 1979) 12. 
48 B Juratowitch, ‘Questioning prospective overruling’ [2007] 3 New Zeland 
Law Review 393. 
49 A G L Nichol, ‘Prospective overruling: a new device for English Courts?’ 
(1976) 39 Modern Law Review 548.
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past events (adjudicate) but also develop and determine the law as it will 
apply on future occasions (legislate).  It is a corollary of the doctrine of 
precedent that each pronouncement of law is “descriptive of what the 
judges believe the law to be, and prescriptive of what it should be in 
the future”.50  It cannot be said therefore that the court’s perspective is 
solely directed at the particular dispute before the court; rather, common 
law courts simultaneously prescribe rules for the future whilst settling 
disputes.  This dual function is performed most obviously when a court 
overturns an established precedent. 
The root of my disagreement with opponents, such as Dr Juratowitch, 
stems from disagreement about the extent to which appellate courts 
perform a legislative function by prescribing new common law rules. 
I contend that when an appellate court overturns a prior precedent 
the court is acting just as much as a legislator as it is an adjudicator. 
Accordingly, it may be appropriate for the consequences of the courts’ 
decision to be more akin to prospective legislation than retrospective 
adjudication. 
In contrast, Dr Juratowitch suggests that the constitutional role of 
common law courts is to be “incidentally creative”51 and only develop 
the law “interstitially to meet the needs of the case before it”.52  This is an 
accurate description of the judicial role in most cases.  However, when 
appellate courts are asked to overturn established law, the courts do not 
have the luxury of being only incidentally creative. 
When the House of Lords in Spectrum Plus held Siebe Gorman to 
be wrong in law their Lordships were prescribing new rules for all 
bank debentures by changing the characteristics of fixed and floating 
charges.  The House of Lords was thus performing the dual functions 
of adjudicating and legislating. The effect of the decision of the New 
Zealand Supreme Court in Chamberlains v Lai was also legislative as much 
as adjudicative.  By holding that the particular barrister in the case was 
generally not immune from suits of negligence in relation to protected 
conduct the court enacted a significant change in the law of negligence 
that would have future effect. 
Instances of overruling can be viewed from two perspectives: either 
the courts are usurping the legislative function, or, as a consequence of 
the doctrine of precedent, the courts are inevitably required to perform 
a legislative function.  If we adopt the latter perspective, Juratowitch’s 
objection dissolves, as prospective overruling is no longer inconsistent 
with the common law judicial function since the court’s function is, at 
times, inevitably legislative. 
Alternatively, if we view the overturning of prior precedents as 
improperly legislative, we still confront the reality that such overturning 
does occur.  In practice, appellate courts are being legislative by prescribing 
50 Ibid, 542. 
51 Juratowitch, 407.
52 Ibid. 
Prospective overruling – it’s about time
Otago Law Review144 (2009) Vol 12 No 1
new rules that have retrospective effect. Prospective overruling cannot 
be rejected on the grounds that it will make the courts legislative.  The 
horse has already left the stables.  To argue that we should close the stable 
gates, in the face of this reality, is simply not persuasive. 
Once we recognise that courts are performing a legislative function 
by bluntly overturning prior precedents, regardless of our normative 
assessment of that state of affairs, we ought to recognise that it creates a 
problem in the form of retrospective common law.  We cannot then reject 
the solution to this problem that can mitigate the harm that retrospective 
law-making can cause.  Dr Juratowitch describes prospective overruling 
as “blatantly legislative”.53 If it is, it is a blatantly legislative solution to 
a blatantly legislative problem. 
2.  The Pragmatic Objection (to pure prospective overruling) 
Perhaps the most convincing argument against pure prospective 
overruling is the twin objection that prospective overruling leaves a 
successful litigant without a remedy and removes any incentive to 
challenge the prevailing view of the law.54  The concern is that,  although 
a court may agree with a litigant’s contention that the law ought to be 
changed, were the court to enact the change with prospective effect only, 
the litigant would not benefit from the change.  In the immediate case, 
this would mean that a court may agree that the old rule is unfair, and 
should be changed henceforth, yet would still apply the old rule to the 
parties to the proceeding.  From a broader perspective, this would mean 
that there would be no incentive to iniate proceedings to ask the court 
to depart from a prior precedent.  That may in turn stifle development 
of the common law. 
It is worth noting that this objection applies only to pure prospective 
overruling and it is this criticism that directs Tipping J in Chamberlains 
to favour the selective form.  That form of prospective overruling avoids 
the above objection as it does confer the benefit of the change in law on 
the immediate parties even if not to other litigants in similar cases whose 
claims have already crystallised.  However, as we shall see below, there 
are also compelling objections to this selective form. 
I have three responses to the ‘lack of incentives’ objection.  First of all, 
the harm of retrospective overruling itself also deters a court from making 
a change in the law and so deprives a worthy litigant of a remedy.  When 
a court is considering whether or not to overturn a prior precedent,  one 
consideration that can constrain it from introducing a new rule is the 
justified reliance placed upon the old rule by one of the parties.  It may 
be that the retrospective change of the law upsets justified reliance on 
the old rule to the extent that the court declines to overturn the prior 
precedent.  Strict adherence to that approach would prohibit overruling, 
which would again mean that litigants would have no incentive to initiate 
proceedings designed to seek such a change in the law. 
53 Ibid, 407.
54 Spectrum Plus, Lord Nicholls at paragraph 27.
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This matter is illustrated in the case of Geelong Harbour Trust v Gibbs, 
Bright & Co55 in which the High Court of Australia was asked to re-
interpret s 110 of the Geelong Harbour Trust Act 1951.  The Court held 
that although the applicable precedent case of Townsville Harbour Trust v 
Scottish Shire Line56 incorrectly interpreted the statutory provision, since 
the precedent had “stood without question for over fifty years”57 and 
commerce had been conducted on that basis, the prior precedent ought 
not to be overturned.  In this case therefore, a worthy litigant was not 
awarded a remedy and the law was not developed, due to concerns about 
the retrospective effect of overturning a prior precedent. 
Whether pure prospective overruling is possible or not, there will be 
instances where worthy litigants are deprived of a remedy because of 
the courts’ unwillingness to upset justified reliance on an established 
authority.  Therefore, the fact that a litigant may not receive the fruits 
of their labour is not a convincing argment against pure prospective 
overruling because the denial of such a remedy may have the same 
effect. 
In addition, the deterrence from challenging the prevailing view of 
the law because of the risk of only prospective change should not be 
overstated.  Prospective overruling is a discretionary judicial tool which 
the courts may apply in appropriate circumstances.  From the position of 
litigants, it is only one possible outcome.  The court may agree that the 
law should change but, in the circumstances, only with prospective effect. 
Such discretion is required to enable courts  to balance the detriment of 
undercutting one litigant’s justified reliance on established law against 
the detriment of refusing a remedy to a litigant who has successfully 
convinced the court to depart from established law.  So, it is also possible, 
in every such case, that the court will find change in law is required, but 
due to the weighing of the different detriments, the change ought only 
to be applied with retrospective effect.  
Pure prospective overruling adds an extra variable into arguments 
about the overruling of  prior precedents, but, since it is only one possible 
outcome alongside the possibility of retrospective overruling, it should 
not significantly deter litigants from challenging established law. 
Even if, despite these two responses, pure prospective overruling 
still has the effect of deterring litigation and depriving litigants of 
proper remedies, such a concern would only apply significantly less 
to ‘institutional litigants’.  An institutional litigant is interested in the 
long-term effect of the outcome of a particular dispute.58  These ‘repeat 
players’ may be interested in later enforcement of the law or be generally 
concerned about the precedent value of the decision and how it will 
apply in future cases. 
55 Geelong Harbour Trust v Gibbs, Bright & Co (1970) 122 CLR 504.
56 Townsville Harbour Trust v Scottish Shire Line (1914) 18 CLR 306.
57 Geelong Harbour Trust, 505. 
58 Nichol, 498.
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The lack of incentive objection counts much less with regards to these 
institutional litigants.  If an institutional litigant is successful in convincing 
the court to overturn a prior precedent, although it may not immediately 
benefit from the outcome of the particular dispute, it will nonetheless 
benefit from the change in the long term.  It follows that there would 
still be an incentive for these litigants to challenge the prevailing view of 
the law, even when the court has the option of prospectively overruling, 
due to the institutional litigant’s interest in the precedent value of the 
decision.  There seems particular scope for prospective overruling when 
institutional litigants seek to overturn prior precedents. 
3.  Discrimination Objection (to selective prospective overruling)
The final objection criticises only the selective  form of prospective 
overruling.  Lord Nicholls in Spectrum Plus held this approach to be 
discriminatory because it treats persons in like cases differently.59  The 
discrimination occurs when a court decides to overrule a prior precedent 
prospectively, except as regards the events that are subject to the current 
proceeding before the court.  The current litigants may obtain their 
remedy, but no other litigants whose claim has already crystallised. 
The difficulty in this approach is that the events giving rise to the later 
litigants claim may be factually and temporally identical.  The event that 
gave rise to the proceedings that prospectively overruled the old rule 
would be governed by the new rule.  However, the old rule is applied to 
identical events that are not subject to the instant proceeding.  Identical 
events, occurring at the same time, may therefore attract different legal 
consequences by virtue of the selective prospective overruling, and it 
may be largely a matter of chance that one event, and not its identical 
counterpart, came first before the courts. 
It might be contended that enacting any legislative or quasi-legislative 
change necessarily entails a degree of discrimination, since any 
substantive change in law may make something unlawful today that was 
lawful yesterday.  So, every legislative change may fail to treat like cases 
alike.  However, a more accurate way to look at legislative change is to say 
that two events that occur at different times are not ‘like cases’ because 
a characteristic of an event is the time at which it occurred.  Hence, 
legislation would not discriminate,  as different legal consequences would 
be attached to different events.  This is where the comparison between 
selective prospective overruling and legislation uncovers a crucial 
distinction.  Unlike legislation, selective prospective overruling fails to 
treat cases alike that are really alike since two identical events that occur 
at the same time can attract different legal consequences. 
Although Tipping J prefers the selective form, he notes that “exempting 
the immediate parties from any general non-retrospective operation is 
itself somewhat arbitrary”.60  However, Tipping J dismisses this concern 
on the grounds that a “small degree of arbitrariness must be accepted in 
59 Spectrum Plus, Lord Nicholls at paragraph 27. 
60 Chamberlains, Tipping J at paragraph 140.
147
the interests of the law as a whole.  To do otherwise … would stultify the 
common law method…”.61  However, where Tipping J errs in his analysis 
is in assuming that prospective overruling uniquely stifles development 
of the common law.  As discussed above, the constraining principle of 
justified reliance also stifles development.  Since prospective overruling 
is a mere substitute for the constraining principle of justified reliance on 
a prior precedent, Tipping J is wrong in assuming that pure prospective 
overruling would further stifle development, and hence, there are no 
“interests of the law as a whole” to justify the arbitrary nature of selective 
prospective overruling. 
What the discrimination objection successfully identifies is that the 
selective form of prospective overruling undermines a basic tenet of 
the common law: that like cases ought to be treated alike.  Therefore, if 
a court were to prospectively overrule, the usual aproach should be to 
adopt the pure prospective form. 
By means of summation, let us look at Geelong Harbour Trust from 
the perspective as if the High Court of Australia decided to overrule 
Townsville Harbour Trust with pure prospective effect.  Under such an 
approach, all of the events prior to the decision of the Court, including 
the event of the damaged beacon that gave rise to the dispute, would 
be governed by the (incorrect) Townsville interpretation of s 110.  Any 
event that occurred after the date of judgment would be governed by 
the new (correct) Geelong interpretion.  In such  a case, the law is able to 
develop and improve without upsetting any justified reliance on the law 
that was clearly stated.  Moreover, the Harbour Board, as an institutional 
litigant, would also benefit from the prospective re-interpretation of the 
legislation although not benefitting in the instant case. 
Conclusion
The twin demands of upholding certainty and fairness that are placed on 
common law courts force judges to sail between Scylla and Charybdis: 
trying to uphold the doctrine of precedent, which gives the common 
law certainty, whilst also trying to reach a fair and just outcome in the 
particular case.  When the court is asked to overturn a prior precedent 
this task is made even more difficult.  Prospective overruling charts a 
course that carefully balances the impetus to modify the common law, 
on one hand, with the presumption against enacting retrospective law 
on the other.  This enables the court to be flexible, and to provide new 
remedies, whilst disrupting the rule of the law to the least degree possible. 
After all, “He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; 
for time is the greatest innovator”.62
61 Ibid. 
62 Sir Francis Bacon,   Of Innovations, in B H Levy, ‘Realist jurisprudence and 
prospective overruling’ (1960) 109 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1.
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